Case 2:06-cv-00153-RLH-RJJ Document 33 Filed 06/11/07 Page 1 of 7

Plaintiff participated in bridge games, attended meetings concerning senior citizen issues, and was seemingly an active participant in the community. Following allegations of serious inappropriate conduct against Plaintiff by certain Center participants, specifics of which were not immediately made known to Plaintiff, the City informed him that an investigation was being conducted and that he was banned from the Center pending its completion.

Following the completion of the City's investigation, Defendant Norman, the Director of the Department of Parks and Recreation for the City, informed Plaintiff that the allegations against him included a sexual comment directed toward a Center participant and the inappropriate touching of another. No other details were outlined. For these actions, Plaintiff was suspended from the Center and all other City recreational facilities for one year.

After his suspension, Plaintiff sought additional details from Defendants concerning the incidents. Defendants refused and Plaintiff thereafter filed the instant litigation. At issue in the current Motion for Summary Judgment are Plaintiff's claims for violations of Nevada's open meeting law, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy and a § 1983 claim.

For the following reasons, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all causes of action except for Plaintiff's § 1983 claim. Additional relevant facts are outlined below.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is proper when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is "genuine" only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable fact finder could find for the nonmoving party, and a dispute is "material" only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby*,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, and the court must view all facts and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. *Blanck v. Hager*, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1148 (D. Nev. 2005) (citations omitted).

In response to a properly submitted summary judgment motion, the burden shifts to the opposing party to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Henderson v. City of Simi Valley, 305 F.3d 1052, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2002). The non-moving party "may not rely on denials in the pleadings but must produce specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists." *Bhan v. NME Hosp., Inc.*, 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991).

II. Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants move for summary judgment on the following causes of action: (1) violation of Nevada's open meeting law; (2) defamation; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (4) civil conspiracy; and (5) violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff concedes the entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendants on his violation of the open meeting law and civil conspiracy claims. On the remaining causes of action, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation claims and denies summary judgment on his § 1983 claim.

A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

The elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim include: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct with either the intention of, or reckless disregard for, causing emotional distress; (2) severe or extreme emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff; and (3) actual or proximate causation. *Star v. Rabello*, 625 P.2d 90, 92 (Nev. 1981). Regarding the second element, where emotional distress damages are claimed in the absence of physical impact or injury, proof of serious emotional distress causing physical injury or illness must be presented. *Oliver v. Lowe*, 995 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Nev. 2000). Here, assuming *arguendo* that Defendants'

action in ousting Plaintiff from all City recreational facilities constituted extreme and outrageous conduct and that it was the proximate cause of Plaintiff's suffering, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot show that his distress was either severe or extreme.

Following his banishment from City recreational facilities, Plaintiff affirms that on the advice of his doctor about how to handle the stress he endured from the situation, Plaintiff left town and visited a friend in Colorado to get away for a while. He admits that he received no professional counseling or therapy for his distress and, medically, he continued taking the same medications he had prior to the incident. Supporting Plaintiff's testimony is the affidavit of Joyce Haas, Plaintiff's friend with whom he stayed in Colorado, who stated that Plaintiff "was frustrated, nervous, agitated, and exhibited all the signs and symptoms of an individual under great stress." (Opp'n, Haas Aff. at 2.) She further stated that "[t]he only therapy [she] could prescribe was to forget about it and relax." (*Id.*)

While the evidence submitted in support of Plaintiff's claim indicates that he was at least somewhat distressed about being ousted from all City recreational facilities, the Court finds that it does not rise to the level of severe or extreme emotional distress. Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that Defendants' conduct aggravated and enhanced certain of his pre-existing physical disabilities, yet contradicts the allegation in his affidavit by stating that he "monitored [himself] and regulated essentially the same medication [he] had been taking for diabetes, pain, and inflammation." (Opp'n, Larsen Aff. at 8.) Further, Haas's sworn statement that she told Plaintiff to relax and forget about the situation suggests to the Court that not even she believed Plaintiff's distress was severe or extreme. Plaintiff has not submitted any additional or alternative evidence to show that he suffered severe emotional distress. *Miller v. Jones*, 970 P.2d 571, 577 (Nev. 1998) (finding that plaintiff could not sustain his emotional distress claim where although he stated that he was depressed for some time, he did not seek any medical or psychiatric assistance and presented no objectively verifiable evidence of the severity of his distress).

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For these reasons, the Court enters summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

B. Defamation

Under Nevada law, a plaintiff suing for defamation must establish: (1) a false and defamatory statement of fact by the defendant concerning the plaintiff; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third person; (3) fault, amounting to at least negligence; and (4) actual or presumed damages. *Pope v. Motel 6*, 114 P.3d 277, 282 (Nev. 2005). Defendants dispute that any alleged defamatory statements were published or made.

First, Defendants argue that should the City's suspension letters constitute defamatory statements, they were not published because they were not distributed to anyone outside the City government. The Court agrees. Plaintiff has brought forth no evidence contradicting this assertion and therefore the suspension letters cannot sufficiently support his defamation claim. Second, the Parties dispute whether an alleged announcement made by a City employee, Susan Bobby ("Bobby"), the Director of the Center, was defamatory. Defendants not only dispute that the announcement was made, they further dispute that it was defamatory in nature.

According to the declaration of Harold Winall ("Winall"), a Center participant who alleges to have witnessed the announcement, Bobby entered the bridge room of the Center and announced to all those present that an investigation into Plaintiff's conduct was being conducted and that anyone with information should meet in the library. Winall states that though he does not recall the exact language used, "there's no question but that they were looking for something adverse." (Opp'n, Winall Decl. at 1.) In contrast, Bobby affirms that she never made a public announcement but admits stating to certain individuals that if they needed to discuss anything related to Plaintiff, Center officials were available for discussion. Moreover, Bobby denies that she told the Center participants that an investigation was being conducted.

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Taking the allegations against Defendants as true for purposes of summary judgment, the Court finds that Bobby's alleged announcement of an investigation cannot be found defamatory by a reasonable jury. A statement is defamatory when it "tend[s] to lower the subject in the estimation of the community, excite derogatory opinions about the subject, and hold the subject up to contempt." *Pegasus v. Reno Newspapers, Inc.*, 57 P.3d 82, 88 (Nev. 2002). An investigation into a person's actions does not necessarily imply that some type of negative conduct occurred. A finding that an announcement of an investigation is defamatory in nature would effectively hinder an entity's, such as the City's, ability to carry out the investigation. While Winall declares that Bobby's announcement indicated that she was looking for "something adverse," Plaintiff does not allege that Bobby detailed the nature of the investigation to those present at the Center so as to allow those who heard the purported announcement to draw any negative inferences about Plaintiff. Thus, the announcement, if made, was not defamatory.

Accordingly, the Court enters summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff's defamation claim.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff brings a § 1983 claim for violations of his right to freedom of speech, freedom of association and due process against the City, and Norman and Ihmels in their official capacities. In the Court's earlier motion to dismiss Order (Dkt. #16), the Court found that Defendants' one year ban from all City recreational facilities could be found to have burdened Plaintiff's rights to freedom of speech and association because it prohibited all speech, regardless of content, and because it denied him physical access to all facilities, at all times, and for all purposes. Particularly, it stated that the restriction's duration was excessive and its scope not narrowly tailored because, for example, Defendants could have served the governmental interest in preventing Plaintiff from sexually harassing female bridge players by restricting Plaintiff from attending the bridge games only at the Center where the alleged incidents took place. In its current summary judgment motion, Defendants fail to address the Court's concerns about the perceived

1 excessiveness of these restrictions. While Defendants note that Plaintiff was invited to public 2 meetings and provided certain documents to Plaintiff, those limited efforts fail to address the full 3 scope of the restriction, as public meetings were just one activity among many from which Plaintiff's access was restricted. 4 5 Similarly, Defendants fail to address the due process concerns raised by the Court 6 in the same Order. On this issue, the Court noted the City's lack of proper notice to Plaintiff 7 regarding the investigation, the lack of detail surrounding the alleged misconduct by Plaintiff, and 8 the denial of an opportunity for Plaintiff to be heard. Nowhere in Defendants' motion are these 9 issues addressed. For these reasons, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to meet their summary judgment burden on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim and, accordingly, the Court denies summary 10 11 judgment on this cause of action. 12 **CONCLUSION** 13 Accordingly, and for good cause appearing, 14 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (#25, 15 ERRATA #26) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows: 16 1. GRANTED in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff's claims for violations of Nevada's open meeting law, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil 17 18 conspiracy. 19 2. DENIED on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim. 20 21 Dated: June 7, 2007. 22 23 24 Chief United States District Judge 25 26